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UID:pretalx-bsmconf-JVYYBZ@cfp.3mdeb.com
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20260925T123000
DTEND;TZID=CET:20260925T130000
DESCRIPTION:Verified boot is a solved-on-paper problem: a hardware root of 
 trust measures and authorizes each stage up to the application. But on edg
 e devices that fetch and execute **dynamic workloads** — OTA firmware mo
 dules\, plugins\, updatable logic — the trust chain typically terminates
  at the application image. Everything the application loads afterward runs
  unverified. For a fleet of internet-facing microcontrollers\, that is the
  entire attack surface that matters\, and it sits *outside* the boot-secur
 ity envelope.
DTSTAMP:20260815T030824Z
LOCATION:GPN-T Main Room
SUMMARY:Where the Chain of Trust Goes Dark: Extending Verified Boot to Sign
 ed Wasm Workloads on Microcontrollers - Kamil Wcisło
URL:https://cfp.3mdeb.com/bsmconf/talk/JVYYBZ/
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