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UID:pretalx-bsmconf-KW3SYT@cfp.3mdeb.com
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20260924T123000
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DESCRIPTION:NOVA is an open-source microhypervisor for x86_64 and aarch64\,
  whose central design property is a deliberately minimal trusted computing
  base that implements capability-based authorization and hardware virtuali
 zation.  Because small size alone does not make a TCB trustworthy\, this t
 alk is about how NOVA grounds that trust in hardware.\n\nThe core of the t
 alk is the measurement chain. We explore DRTM via Intel TXT and the intera
 ction between NOVA and SINIT\, then how NOVA extends the TPM measurement c
 hain into the running hypervisor and the first user-level protection domai
 n - giving remote attestation a basis that does not depend on firmware hon
 esty after the measured launch.\n\nAround that foundation are two runtime 
 isolation boundaries\, which NOVA enforces at the hardware-software interf
 ace.  The IOMMU constrains both DMA and interrupts: every DMA-capable devi
 ce runs against a per-domain translation table\, and interrupt remapping p
 revents a compromised device or guest from injecting arbitrary vectors.  I
 ntel TME-MK then assigns each protection domain its own memory-encryption 
 key\, so tenant isolation survives DRAM-level adversaries as well as the s
 oftware-boundary mistakes that would otherwise expose cleartext memory acr
 oss domains.\n\nWe close with what a small TCB buys: formal verification b
 ecomes feasible\, and NOVA's specifications can be mathematically proven c
 orrect rather than only tested against.  The attack classes that remain - 
 microarchitectural channels\, adversarial firmware - require complementary
  defenses.
DTSTAMP:20260815T020238Z
LOCATION:GPN-T Main Room
SUMMARY:NOVA: A Hardware-Anchored Microhypervisor with a Minimal TCB - Udo 
 Steinberg
URL:https://cfp.3mdeb.com/bsmconf/talk/KW3SYT/
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