2.0 -//Pentabarf//Schedule//EN PUBLISH GQHEES@@cfp.3mdeb.com -GQHEES Welcome to Qubes OS Summit 2022 Day 1 en en 20220909T100000 20220909T102500 0.02500 Welcome to Qubes OS Summit 2022 Day 1 PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/GQHEES/ Main Room Piotr Król PUBLISH ELU3FR@@cfp.3mdeb.com -ELU3FR Qubes OS development status update en en 20220909T103000 20220909T110000 0.03000 Qubes OS development status update PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/ELU3FR/ Main Room Marek Marczykowski-Górecki PUBLISH WFVXPP@@cfp.3mdeb.com -WFVXPP Building secure applications with Qubes OS en en 20220909T111000 20220909T115000 0.04000 Building secure applications with Qubes OS PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/WFVXPP/ Main Room Michael Z PUBLISH GV3J3E@@cfp.3mdeb.com -GV3J3E Next generation of Qubes OS builder en en 20220909T120000 20220909T122000 0.02000 Next generation of Qubes OS builder PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/GV3J3E/ Main Room Frédéric Pierret PUBLISH XD7NL7@@cfp.3mdeb.com -XD7NL7 Tailoring Qubes for Enterprises en en 20220909T123000 20220909T130000 0.03000 Tailoring Qubes for Enterprises PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/XD7NL7/ Main Room Jan Suhr PUBLISH NXBR97@@cfp.3mdeb.com -NXBR97 Lunch break en en 20220909T131000 20220909T140000 0.05000 Lunch break PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/NXBR97/ Main Room PUBLISH 38K7H7@@cfp.3mdeb.com -38K7H7 Qubes OS Policy: Adventures in UX/UI Design en en 20220909T140000 20220909T143000 0.03000 Qubes OS Policy: Adventures in UX/UI Design As a continuation of last year's redesign of Application Menu, I have been working on making Qubes more accessible for non-expert users and on creating GUI tools for system configuration that would be friendlier and easier-to-use than existing tools. This time, I took on the challenge of creating a graphical editor for various policy files. This talk will cover the results of user research, the challenges encountered during design and implementation, and show off the tools created as a result of this research. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/38K7H7/ Main Room Marta "marmarta" Marczykowska-Górecka PUBLISH QBU3JN@@cfp.3mdeb.com -QBU3JN GPU Virtual Machine (GVM) en en 20220909T144000 20220909T151000 0.03000 GPU Virtual Machine (GVM) In this talk OpenMdev developers Arthur Rasmusson and Michael Buchel plan to give an overview of GPU Virtual Machine (GVM) and how it works to allow virtual machine guests to run unmodified GPU drivers (non-paravirtual) on ordinary GPUs such as those in laptops, desktops, embedded devices, and servers. We’d also like to take some time to talk about ongoing efforts to improve support for devices and areas of collaboration where we might best provide support to QubesOS for integrating OpenMdev tools like GVM for enhanced GPU virtualization. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/QBU3JN/ Main Room Arthur Rasmusson PUBLISH ZY8KHW@@cfp.3mdeb.com -ZY8KHW Isolating GUIs with the power of Wayland en en 20220909T152000 20220909T155000 0.03000 Isolating GUIs with the power of Wayland PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/ZY8KHW/ Main Room Puck Meerburg PUBLISH JKWNGD@@cfp.3mdeb.com -JKWNGD PipeWire and Qubes Video Companion en en 20220909T160000 20220909T163000 0.03000 PipeWire and Qubes Video Companion Audio capture and playback in Qubes OS has several limitations. It is very easy to forget to attach a microphone to a qube, or to forget to detach it later. Furthermore, the latency is high, and both recording and playback require a module using the unstable PulseCore API. I am currently replacing the audio agent with a solution based on PipeWire, which will offer better performance and be easier to maintain. In the future, I plan on enhancing the user interface to avoid the user experience pitfalls. Video capture has significant limitations as well. The only currently-supported solution is webcam pass-through, which has both security and reliability concerns. Cross-VM screensharing is not supported at all. Elliot Killick created Qubes Video Companion in April 2021, and I have been working to integrate it into Qubes OS. It will ship with R4.2 and I hope to backport it to R4.1. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/JKWNGD/ Main Room Demi Marie Obenour PUBLISH 9XR3K3@@cfp.3mdeb.com -9XR3K3 Design session: graphical subsystem (GPU, Wayland) en en 20220909T164000 20220909T174000 1.00000 Design session: graphical subsystem (GPU, Wayland) PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/9XR3K3/ Main Room Marek Marczykowski-Górecki PUBLISH XGMQYH@@cfp.3mdeb.com -XGMQYH Qubes OS Summit 2022 - Day 1 closing notes en en 20220909T175000 20220909T180000 0.01000 Qubes OS Summit 2022 - Day 1 closing notes PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/XGMQYH/ Main Room Piotr Król PUBLISH 3FUFUS@@cfp.3mdeb.com -3FUFUS Afterparty en en 20220909T193000 20220909T233000 4.00000 Afterparty PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/3FUFUS/ Main Room PUBLISH D3XFP9@@cfp.3mdeb.com -D3XFP9 Welcome to Qubes OS Summit 2022 Day 2 en en 20220910T100000 20220910T101000 0.01000 Welcome to Qubes OS Summit 2022 Day 2 PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/D3XFP9/ Main Room Piotr Król PUBLISH VD3VCE@@cfp.3mdeb.com -VD3VCE How Dasharo coreboot based firmware helps NovaCustom's customers en en 20220910T102000 20220910T103500 0.01500 How Dasharo coreboot based firmware helps NovaCustom's customers PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/VD3VCE/ Main Room Wessel klein Snakenborg PUBLISH TUHNPU@@cfp.3mdeb.com -TUHNPU Qubes User Support Stories en en 20220910T104500 20220910T111500 0.03000 Qubes User Support Stories Qubes is the most common operation system we preinstall on our products. Based on that, we have a lot of support questions. We want to share our experience with that. What are the most common problems? Where lying the biggest security traps for users? What needs to be done to enable user who really should use Qubes. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/TUHNPU/ Main Room nestire PUBLISH EZ37TZ@@cfp.3mdeb.com -EZ37TZ Qubes OS Documentation Localization en en 20220910T113000 20220910T120000 0.03000 Qubes OS Documentation Localization The topic of this talk is the localization of the official Qubes OS documentation (Github [repo](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-doc)) and will cover the steps already taken, the current status and the future tasks. We will take a look at the tech stack and the tools used to build the proposed localization workflow and will wrap up with outlook, next steps and call for participation :) The ultimate goal of the endeavour is continuous localization and thus delivering quality translations quickly and reliably. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/EZ37TZ/ Main Room m Tobias Killer PUBLISH QXZBDZ@@cfp.3mdeb.com -QXZBDZ Qubes OS on modern Alder Lake desktop en en 20220910T121000 20220910T124000 0.03000 Qubes OS on modern Alder Lake desktop PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/QXZBDZ/ Main Room Michał Żygowski PUBLISH FKADXK@@cfp.3mdeb.com -FKADXK Lunch break en en 20220910T125000 20220910T140000 1.01000 Lunch break PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/FKADXK/ Main Room PUBLISH PCXEHT@@cfp.3mdeb.com -PCXEHT Qubes OS: Towards Being a Reasonably Learnable System en en 20220910T140000 20220910T143000 0.03000 Qubes OS: Towards Being a Reasonably Learnable System PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/PCXEHT/ Main Room Deeplow PUBLISH 3PTQJU@@cfp.3mdeb.com -3PTQJU TrenchBoot - the only AEM-way to boot Qubes OS en en 20220910T144000 20220910T151000 0.03000 TrenchBoot - the only AEM-way to boot Qubes OS The firmware is the heart of the security of a given system and should always be up-to-date to maintain the computer's security. However, being up to date does not prevent the firmware vulnerabilities from appearing. The Static Root of Trust (SRT) like Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Secure Boot and measured boot provided by the firmware is not always sufficient to establish a secure environment for an operating system. If the firmware is compromised, it could inject malicious software into operating system components and prevent the machine owner from detecting it. Silicon vendors implement alternative technologies to establish a Dynamic Root of Trust (DRT) to provide a secure environment for operating system launch and integrity measurements. Either from SRT or DRT, these integrity measurements can be used for operating system attestation. However, DRT technologies are designed to provide the ability to establish a secure environment for integrity measurements at any arbitrary point of time instead of relying on the firmware, which requires machine reset to establish the aforementioned secure environment. The usage of Dynamic Root of Trust technologies like Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) or AMD Secure Startup becomes more and more significant, for example, Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (D-RTM) requirements of Microsoft Secured Core PCs[6]. D-RTM hasn't found its place in open-source projects yet, but that gradually changes. The demand on having firmware independent Roots of Trust is increasing, and projects that satisfy this demand are growing, for instance, TrenchBoot. TrenchBoot is a framework that allows individuals and projects to build security engines to perform launch integrity actions for their systems. The framework builds upon Boot Integrity Technologies (BITs) that establish one or more Roots of Trust (RoT) from which a degree of confidence that integrity actions were not subverted. The project has grown a lot thanks to the previous NLnet NGI0 PET[7] grant and now it looks for further expansion into extensive use of the DRT technologies in open-source and security-oriented operating systems like Qubes OS. Qubes OS Anti Evil Maid (AEM) software heavily depends on the availability of the D-RTM technologies to prevent the Evil Maid attacks. However, the project hasn't evolved much since the beginning of 2018 and froze on the support of TPM 1.2 with Intel TXT in legacy boot mode (BIOS). Because of that, the usage of this security software is effectively limited to older Intel machines only. TPM 1.2 implemented SHA1 hashing algorithm, which is nowadays considered weak in the era of forever-increasing computer performance and quantum computing. The solution to this problem comes with a newer TPM 2.0 with more agile cryptographic algorithms and SHA256 implementation by default. The initial AEM implementation relied on the Trusted Boot[8], Intel's reference implementation of Intel TXT. It never had any plans to support AMD processors. TrenchBoot is filling this gap, supporting both Intel and AMD hardware which makes it an ideal target to replace Trusted Boot in Qubes OS AEM implementation. Furthermore, the project grant would be used to implement the missing pieces in the Qubes OS AEM software to cover the AMD and Intel support for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0. [6] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-highly-secure#what-makes-a-secured-core-pc [7] https://nlnet.nl/project/OpenDRTM/ [8] https://sourceforge.net/p/tboot/wiki/Home/ PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/3PTQJU/ Main Room Michał Żygowski PUBLISH DJ3MF3@@cfp.3mdeb.com -DJ3MF3 Secure hardware for a secure operating system en en 20220910T152000 20220910T155000 0.03000 Secure hardware for a secure operating system Hacks of one form or another are a dime a dozen these days. It doesn’t take long to find out about the latest local government or hospital system getting ransomwared, the millions of credit card numbers leaked via a hacked retailer’s POS system, or even the less frequent state sponsored APT hacking of a global corporation to facilitate easy access to the corporation’s entire customer base. Usually, the malware is found, neutralized, and companies and governments go back to business as usual (commonly with a higher IT budget). But what if the malware can’t be neutralized so easily? What if that malware is able to persist despite a clean install of the operating system on a new drive? This is the fate of a firmware vulnerability. In this session we are going to discuss why you should care about open source firmware and the ways we can reduce the risk of firmware persistent malware. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/DJ3MF3/ Main Room Brent Cowing PUBLISH MTVKMH@@cfp.3mdeb.com -MTVKMH Design session: hardware requirements, firmware security en en 20220910T160000 20220910T170000 1.00000 Design session: hardware requirements, firmware security PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/MTVKMH/ Main Room Marek Marczykowski-Górecki PUBLISH YMETHE@@cfp.3mdeb.com -YMETHE Dasharo vs vendor firmware performance on QubesOS - a comparison en en 20220910T171000 20220910T174000 0.03000 Dasharo vs vendor firmware performance on QubesOS - a comparison Users of open firmware often face a reduction in feature set and performance of the platform when migrating from vendor-provided, optimized, proprietary BIOS. Modern platforms feature a multitude of performance, power and thermal knobs that are sometimes not very well documented, and it requires a lot of time and experience to tune them for a specific mainboard. In this presentation I will present actual difference in performance as measured by a set of benchmarks, talk about what causes them and what challenges there are to bring performance to a state that is competitive with the vendor BIOS. We'll also discuss how these differences may impact QubesOS users. PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/YMETHE/ Main Room Michał Kopeć PUBLISH PPJSL7@@cfp.3mdeb.com -PPJSL7 Qubes OS Summit 2022 - Day 2 closing notes en en 20220910T175000 20220910T180000 0.01000 Qubes OS Summit 2022 - Day 2 closing notes PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/PPJSL7/ Main Room Piotr Król PUBLISH VP9TKU@@cfp.3mdeb.com -VP9TKU Hackathon en en 20220911T100000 20220911T130000 3.00000 Hackathon PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/VP9TKU/ Main Room PUBLISH UQQLAZ@@cfp.3mdeb.com -UQQLAZ Lunch break en en 20220911T130000 20220911T140000 1.00000 Lunch break PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/UQQLAZ/ Main Room PUBLISH TW7QQG@@cfp.3mdeb.com -TW7QQG Hackathon en en 20220911T140000 20220911T180000 4.00000 Hackathon PUBLIC CONFIRMED Speaker at location https://cfp.3mdeb.com/qubes-os-summit-2022/talk/TW7QQG/ Main Room